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In the days of the “toad test”: 
justice and abortion in mid-twentieth-century 
Argentina 
Agustina CEPEDA 
This article forms part of a research project about different kinds of 
judicial control over women’s bodies from 1940 to 1994 in Buenos 
Aires province.1 Through a long-term study of a series of legal 
proceedings in trials for abortion, the idea is to analyze the dynamics of 
criminal justice in terms of its interpretation of the law and to correlate the 
findings with the different political and medical contexts. Abortion is 
illegal in Argentina, except in cases of rape, or when the woman has 
been declared insane or her life or health is in danger (articles 85 to 88 
of the 1921 Reformed Penal Code).  
This paper’s scope is more limited, as it deals with the Peronist 
experience in the years 1946-1955. The era’s population policies have 
led to heated historiographical debate over whether they should be 
defined as pro-natalist or pro-maternalist.2 During this period too, a 
                                                     
1 The title of my social-sciences thesis is: Corpus delicti: women, abortion and justice - 
Argentina 1940-1994, IDES-UNGS. An earlier version of this article was 
presented at the Eighth Mercosur Anthropology Reunion (Buenos Aires, 2009) 
and at the Gino Germani Institute’s Eighth National Multidisciplinary Debate 
Days about Health and Population (2009).  
2 For gender and Peronism, see Valobra, 2004-2005. 
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pregnancy test devised by the Argentinean doctor Carlos Galli Mainini 
(1914-1967), an endocrinologist trained in Italy and at Harvard, became 
widely used. In 1947, Mainini published El Test del Sapo o El diagnóstico 
del embarazo con batracios machos (The Toad Test or detecting pregnancy 
with male batrachians). 
By focusing on the emblematic 1954 case of Elena Teotina Haedo 
de Gaitán and the midwife Catalina Fuccia – who were cleared of 
charges for abortion on the grounds of an “impossible abortion 
attempt” – this article aims to contribute to the debate and to 
understand the bio-normative system imposed on women. Like Elisa 
Guerra Speckman,3 I will try to reveal the way in which the people 
administering the criminal justice system settled conflicts relating to 
the illegal termination of pregnancy.  
Pro-natalism or pro-maternalism: the terms of the debate 
Pro-natalism can be defined as a set of economic, social and judicial 
measures taken by a government to encourage fertility. For example, 
European feminist studies from the 1980s and 1990s have defined the 
policies of pre-1945 Fascist Italy and post-1945 Francoist Spain as pro-
natalist.4 In the context of a steep drop in birth rates, these 
governments encouraged an increase in the number of children per 
woman in a nationalist perspective. To prevent neo-Malthusian or 
eugenics-inspired behaviors, these policies were essentially aimed at 
discouraging birth-control practices.5  
Nevertheless, very early on, studies of pro-natalism pointed out 
the limits of populationist policies, whose actual effect on the number 
of children was limited. The notion of pro-maternalism6 better 
expresses policies that laud maternity as a social and civic 
responsibility, by referring to medical and moral notions about 
women’s role as mothers. More generally, this concept focuses on 
measures protecting children, women and families. 
                                                     
3 Speckman Guerra 2002. 
4 Thébaud 1992. 
5 Nari 2004; Miranda & Grión Sierra 2009; Eraso 2007; Otero 2004. 
6 Bock & Thane 1996. 
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Argentina experienced an unusual demographic transition7, 
because the birth rate dropped at the same time as the mortality rate. 
This particularity led to a crackdown on birth-control methods used 
by women. As historian Marcela Nari has pointed out,8 in the 1920s 
and 1930s, doctors and authorities on criminal law who opposed 
birth control mainly targeted abortion. Along with infanticide and 
abandoning children, abortion practices were the main concern, 
because they challenged theories that defined maternity as a “natural 
instinct for self-abnegation.” Around 1940, concerns about the 
declining birth rate – and the risks inherent in the drop in the number 
of births for developing the nation’s power – increased. 
Historiography has long considered the years during and immediately 
after World War II as “pro-natalist,” with the benefit money granted 
by the state for the birth of children as the most obvious proof.9 
Demographer Susana Torrado, for example, shows that although 
around 1930, the birth rate dropped to below 30 per 1000, the trend 
was reversed during the period from 1945 to 195110.  
 Yet some gender-conscious studies have pointed out that this data 
was not cross-referenced with other indexes, and that the statistics do 
not in fact point to a baby boom during the Peronist era.11 Rather 
than a pro-natalist policy focusing on the number of children, the 
policy actually provided aid for children. For example, the Peronist 
government’s first five-year plan (1947-1951) explicitly promoted the 
indissolubility of marriage and planned for anti-abortion campaigns. 
The second plan assigned the government the goal of increasing the 
rights of families by encouraging the constitution of inheritance 
entitlements, broadening access to family allowances and benefits, 
creating tax exemptions, and even eliminating civil discrimination 
towards children born out of wedlock. For Dora Barrancos, these are 
indeed “pro-maternalist” policies that reinforce the institution of the 
family and its well-being by protecting motherhood and by assisting 
                                                     
7  Pantelides 1983. 
8 Nari 1996 and 2004. 
9 Di Liscia 1999; Torrado 2003; Bianchi 1993. 
10 Torrado 2003: 86. 
11 Barrancos 2001; Valobra 2004-2005. 
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children in particular.12 The National Directorate of Social Assistance 
was founded at that time (Law 13341, in 1948). In addition, the rule 
that punished mothers for abandoning children was also revoked. 
Nothing encouraged judicial proceedings against women who 
terminated pregnancies, even though – as the statistical data shows – 
women were resorting to abortion more often during the post-war 
years, in the context of the social transformations of the world of 
work and of political life.  
Under the Peronist governments of 1946-1955, a nuclear family 
ideology that tended to reduce the number of children per family and 
to shrink family-relationship networks was actually being promoted.13 
No parliamentary actions were taken to change the sentence for 
abortion or to increase sanctions against it. Obstetrical practices were 
not overseen more closely, contraceptives were not taken off the 
market (as the 1974 Peronist government would later do)14 and 
neither illegal abortionists nor women who had abortions were 
deliberately prosecuted.  
Justice and abortion: an emblematic case  
In 1947, when Peronist prison reform was being implemented,15 
Felicitas Krimpel – a Chilean jurist, feminist and criminologist – 
presented her plan for turning women’s prisons into reform centers 
in the journal Revista penal y penitenciaria. She explained the injustice 
done to women to Roberto Petinatto, the General Director of Penal 
Institutions, in the following terms: 
If we consider the many cases of women who are convicted of 
infanticide, abortion or adultery, we will see that in each of these cases 
where the law has condemned the woman only, the man’s egoism 
appears clearly, as well as the legislators’ failure to understand the need 
to face up to a problem that we have not managed to resolve entirely. An 
indigent woman, burdened by difficult circumstances and lack of 
                                                     
12 Barrancos 2001. In addition, Karina Ramaccioti (2004) studied Maternal Benefits. 
She finds clear evidence that Peronist pro-maternalism was more concerned with 
stay-at-home mothers than with working women with children. 
13 Cosse 2006. 
14 Felliti 2005. 
15 Caimari 2004. 
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education, by shame and poverty, gets rid of the fruit of illegitimate love. 
The law hounds her pitilessly and puts her in prison (…).  
The man, who is at least as guilty as she in engendering a life without the 
slightest sense of responsibility, remains free and carries on with his fatal 
deeds, thereby encouraging social ills, hatred and misery. 
While it is true that women were more likely to be accused of and 
convicted on charges of abortion and infanticide, many of them were 
acquitted and freed, for the very reasons that Felicitas Krimpel refers 
to. According to the prison-population statistics published in the 
same journal, between 1946 and 1955, the number of women 
remanded in custody on charges of abortion in Argentina averaged 27 
a year.16 Out of this average number, approximately 85% were 
acquitted (charges dropped for lack of cause justifying judicial action) 
or found not guilty. When the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Buenos Aires province and the National Appellate Court in terms of 
criminality in the city of Buenos Aires are analyzed, we see that the 
most common judicial stance for justifying acquittal is the impossible 
criminal attempt or impossible abortion offense. 
Let us examine a case from late 1954 in Buenos Aires, involving 
the midwife Catalina Fuccia and Elena Teotina Haedo de Gaitán. The 
former was accused of committing abortive measures on the latter, 
with her consent.17 
Buenos Aires, September 1954. Inspector Federico G. Mendizábal testifies 
that on May 3 of this year, at 3:30 A.M., he was called in by the guard at 
Policlínico Teodoro Alvarez Hospital, because of a woman, Elena H. de 
Gaitán (…) Interrogated on the spot, Elena Teotina Haedo de Gaitán 
confessed that in late March of this year, not having had her menstrual 
period, she believed herself to be pregnant. She went to the office of 
Señora Fuccia on April 3 of this year in order to have an abortion. 
                                                     
16 Most of the women accused of and tried for abortion were held at the Asilo 
Correccional de Mujeres, in Buenos Aires. The other prisons that housed women 
accused of abortion were Formosa, Posadas, Presidencia Roque Sáenz Peña, Santa 
Rosa and Neuquén. 
17 Jurisprudencia Argentina 1955, tome II, April, May, June, p. 458-459. It is 
impossible to access the files because of the justice department’s file-
conservation and destruction policies. The decision was pronounced by the 
National Criminal Appellate Court of the City of Buenos Aires.  
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Señora Fuccia had her lie down on a stretcher, and inserted a sharp object 
into her vagina, which she was supposed to leave there for 24 hours. She 
was estimated to be 40 days pregnant. The next day, she removed the 
object herself, and hemorrhaged blood, including clots, which led her to 
believe that the abortion had been successful. After 20 days of bleeding, 
she went back to Señora Fuccia, who advised her to lie down and place a 
bag of gel on her stomach. Because the bleeding continued, she went back 
to the midwife, who refused to treat her this time, which is why she went 
to Alvarez Hospital. Señora Gaitán did not wish to have another child, 
because she is already living in cramped quarters, insofar as she, her 
husband and their two children live in a single room.  
The midwife Catalina Fuccia acknowledges that Señora Gaitán did indeed 
come to her for an abortion at the time and place stated, and that she did 
insert a sharp object inside her and give the instructions that Señora Gaitán 
referred to. The rest of her statement is identical to her co-defendant’s. 
The prosecutor accuses these women of committing the offense of 
abortion (Article 85, Paragraph 2, and Article 88 of the penal code) and 
asks for them to be sentenced to: one year and six months in prison for 
Catalina Fuccia; one year for Elena Teotina Haedo de Gaitán, and for both 
of them to bear the cost of the judicial procedure. Señora Fuccia’s lawyer 
asks for the facts to be viewed as an impossible abortion attempt, and for 
his client to be acquitted. Señora Elena Teotina Haedo de Gaitán’s public 
defender also asks for an acquittal, in his presentation on page 47.  
The Court took into account both the fact that neither of the 
accused had any prior convictions and the reasons that led the 
pregnant woman to commit her act. Both women were given 
suspended sentences for the terms requested by the prosecutor. The 
defendants and their lawyers appealed the decision. On March 11, 
1955, Judge Mario Oderigo stated to the Appellate Court:  
In my opinion, the two defense laywers are right, and their logic is 
undeniable. Señora Fuccia admits having committed abortive measures 
on the person of Señora Gaitán, who recognizes having consented to 
this. These acts are proven, because, even though there was no trace of 
them when the medical examiner whose report is on page 36 performed 
his examination, they had been proven beyond reasonable doubt in the 
medical officer’s report on page 7 (art. 346, Criminal Code). But what 
has not in any way been proven is whether Señora Gaitán was in fact 
pregnant at the time that these acts were committed. The report on page 
7 cannot be taken into consideration on this point, because its laconism 
on the subject can only be interpreted as the result of simple inference 
on the part of the doctor who examined the patient. It is practically 
superfluous to repeat that the so-called condition of pregnancy – an 
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essential element for the offense of abortion to take place – cannot be 
proven by confession or clues, because these elements are not sufficient 
to prove the offense, as this court has already stated repeatedly. We are, 
therefore, dealing with an attempt at an impossible abortion, which is 
not punishable for the woman, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 88 of the Penal Code, which allows for an exemption or 
reduction in sentencing for a third party.  
Impossible abortion attempt? The defendants’ lawyers drew attention 
to a crucial question: was Elena Gaitán actually pregnant? And the 
judge acquitted them. If Peronist politicians’ population goal had been 
to increase the number of children per family, criminal proceedings 
against abortion would have been more hard-hitting. Whereas in fact, 
the use of a judicial loophole allowing for acquittal of the accused 
would seem to show a lack of interest in punishing the crime. But let’s 
take a closer look at the “impossible abortion offense.”  
The impossible abortion offense 
The Argentinian Penal Code dealt with the question of the impossible 
offense in Title VI of Book I, devoted to “attempted offenses,” but it 
omitted to include in that notion any reference to appropriate 
means,18 which makes the impossible offense an attempt.19 Neither 
the judges nor the lawyers in the Fuccia-Gaitán case employed 
particularly original arguments in their search for a loophole in favor 
of the accused. In 1901, Franz von Lizt, an Austrian jurist, had 
pointed out that “an attempted abortion on a woman who isn’t 
pregnant is punishable when the pregnancy is not absolutely 
impossible; the attempt to cause the death of a stillborn child is 
punishable if the death is not indisputable.” In Argentina, from very 
early on, theoretical discussions about the jurisprudence of the 
judicial stance on “attempts” were taking into account the situation of 
abortive measures being applied to a woman who was not in fact 
                                                     
18 Cavallero 1983. 
19 Penal reform of 1921. The last paragraph of article 44 of the applicable Penal 
Code states: “If the offense was impossible, the sentence will be reduced by half, 
and can be reduced to the legal minimum or be excluded, depending on the 
degree of dangerousness shown by the delinquent.” 
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pregnant. The impossible abortion offense has not been punishable 
since 1903. 
The Fuccia-Gaitán case was not the first one to have been settled 
in that manner. Since 1941, several pronouncements by provincial 
Courts of Appeal had acquitted women, midwives, concubines and 
husbands of the offense of abortion by finding their acts to be 
impossible offenses in light of the evidence. In none of these cases could 
the pregnancy of the woman who underwent an abortion be 
“scientifically” proven. The painful or mortal “abortive measures” 
were merely “attempts”; there was no “corpus delicti,” only resorting 
to an illegal practice.20 
Most criminal suits for abortion stemmed from the woman being 
denounced by a doctor or other medical practitioner in a public 
hospital. Women would go there because of infections caused by the 
abortive measure, and police involvement would begin at that point. 
During the trial, the victims would be described as good mothers or 
as women whose “honor must be protected,” and the absence of a 
criminal record as well as neighbors’ testimony as to their good 
character would count in their favor. Judicial procedures included 
medical examiners’ reports, official searches of backstreet clinics, 
taking witnesses’ testimony, lengthy interrogations of the defendants 
and collecting the materials used to perform the abortions (pointed 
objects, pills, bandages and blood-stained cloths). These lengthy 
judicial procedures could lead to a modification of the accusation, if 
pregnancy prior to the illegal measures could not be proven. 
In accordance with the Argentinian Penal Code, confession alone is 
not sufficient evidence for convicting someone. And just as 
“confession and evidence” couldn’t confirm the pregnancy, early 
pregnancy-detection methods didn’t allow it either, at least not at the 
time of the case in question. At that time, biological tests were based 
on the effects produced by HCG (human chorionic gonadotropin) on 
the reproductive organs of various animals (rats, rabbits, frogs, toads). 
                                                     
20 The “corpus delicti” is something that must be shown; it is not a fact, but a factum 
probandum. The corpus delicti is composed of three parts: corpus criminis (the 
outcome of the crime), corpus probationi (the evidence), corpus instrumentori (the 
instrument).  
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As a review of medical and gynecological magazines shows, as early as 
1934, practical applications of the Friedman reaction were used to test 
for pregnancy. Discovered in 1931, that test was based on obtaining 
“ovarian hyperemia in rabbits after the injection of a pregnant woman’s 
urine in marginal ear veins.” But its reliability was contested by several 
doctors, who expressed their misgivings in scientific journals. A 1947 
decision acquitted the defendants, even though the Friedman chemical-
reaction test had been positive. The judge in that case (the same as in 
the one we have been looking at, Horacio Vera Ocampo) pointed out 
that the “Friedman reaction could give false positives in cases where 
there was in fact no pregnancy, and therefore it could not be used to 
establish tangible truth.21  
Basing his work on earlier research, Carlos Galli Mainini (1914-
1967), a doctor at Rivadavia Hospital, injected urine from pregnant 
women into male Bufo Arenarium toads’ dorsal lymph sac in 1947, and, 
after analyzing 179 cases, concluded that it caused a specific reaction. 
Published in Argentina, in Latin American medical journals and in 
New York, his study caused quite a stir: the description of the 
technique was reproduced in practically all the Argentinian medical 
journals, and its reliability was soon subjected to repeated evaluations, 
the results of which were also published. Considered to be over 99% 
reliable, the “toad test” spread across Argentina and Latin America in 
the 1950s, yet no reference was made to it in the judgment handed 
down in the case of Gaitán and Fuccia.22 
The lack of a reliable technique for establishing whether or not 
Elena Haedo de Gaitán had in fact been pregnant worked in the 
                                                     
21 Law nº 23.429 of 16 November 1947, Criminal Court of the City of Buenos 
Aires. 
22 During my oral survey, poor women whose sons and daughters were born in the 
1950s told me that they had not had blood or urine tests done during their 
pregnancies. Nevertheless, most of them had heard of the toad test at least once. 
One of the women I interviewed remembers: “People from the Sulivan-Díaz 
laboratory would catch toads in the park near my house, when we were living 
near Mar Chiquita. They needed male toads, because the test didn’t work on the 
female ones. They would go back to their lab with bucketfuls of them for their 
tests. That would have been from the late 1940s to 1958, when we were living 
there.” Interview conducted on 11 June 2008. 
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accused’s favor. Precise descriptions of the abortive measures left little 
doubt about her condition, but Argentinian criminal jurisprudence left 
a loophole enabling acquittal. What was the price to pay for this legal 
sleight-of-hand? Should we believe that, during negotiations to define 
an “impossible abortion attempt” women lost their right to be heard, 
and were unable to testify as to “their own pregnant condition”?23 
Women as victims of law and science?  
The offense was not the focus of the Gaitán-Fuccia judgment, and 
there were no moral, pro-natalist or ethical arguments offered. The 
acquittal of the accused was justified by the strict application of legal 
rules. The women’s confessions were subordinated to the “scientific 
evidence”: they were indeed acquitted of the criminal offense, but at 
the same time, they were dispossessed of their specific knowledge 
about pregnancy.24  
In her study of nineteenth-century law in Argentina, Gabriela Dalla-
Corte Caballero demonstrated that cases of abortion, infanticide and 
child abandonment constituted a key element in the construction of 
criminal law as a “field of gender studies”. The legal asymmetry based 
on sexual difference, and the idealization of motherhood and feminine 
honor were legitimized by existing criminal law. Penalization of 
behaviors tied to reproduction differed depending on the sex of the 
defendants. Nevertheless, while an “exegetic” reading of the legislation 
shows that it assigns responsibility to women for criminal acts related 
to reproduction, in the author’s opinion, the interpretations made by 
judges expressed an ambiguous acceptance of the strategies women 
employed to limit births.25   
The “medical or scientific” proof of the pregnant condition 
overrides and discredits women’s own testimony as to their own 
                                                     
23 For a feminist analysis of judicial discourse, see Smart 2000. 
24 It is clear that the appeal to these women’s “honorability” constituted a change in 
orientation in the defense lawyers’ and judges’ arguments. In Argentine, 
“honorability” paired with the typology of offenses has been the subject of 
several highly respected studies (Ruggiero 1994; Rubial 1996).  
25 Dalla Corte Caballero 1996. Other studies have analyzed the legal ban on 
abortion as well as social tolerance of it in Brazil (Pedro 2003). 
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pregnancy. The process of medicalization that giving birth and 
motherhood had been undergoing since the early nineteenth century 
had instituted science as the authority in matters related to pregnancy, 
giving birth, nursing, and caring for young children.26 The possibility 
of “detecting the embryo” had devalued the knowledge of women 
who noticed the “symptoms” of their own pregnancy. Women lost 
their rights to Science and their knowledge to Law.27 
This is where, in my opinion, a problem arises about the place 
taken by the “construction of the maternal role and the ideal of the 
mother” in the historiographic discourse developed in women’s and 
gender history. In studies of social, educational, medical or judicial 
measures relating to motherhood, abortion has been viewed from the 
angle of punishment and discipline exercised over the maternal body. 
Starting from the hypothesis of the effectiveness of legal dictates, 
researchers worked under the assumption that the relationship 
between the Law and sexual difference was obvious: women were the 
victims, and abortion constituted a punishable offense.28 
The mistaken epistemology of standpoint theory underestimates 
the subjects’ capacity for “cheating”, and turns out to be unable to 
expose the contradictions inherent in a liberal legal system relating to 
sexual difference.29 Reading the judgments rendered during the 
                                                     
26 I would like to point out the very interesting work done by Fabiola Rohden about 
the professionalization and growth of gynecology in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) in the 
late nineteenth century as the “science of woman”. Twenty-two per cent of medical 
theses produced between 1833 and 1940 addressed sexuality and reproduction, the 
vast majority of them specifically focusing on women, to whom all problems in 
those areas were ascribed (Rohden 2011 and 2002). 
27 Using a few hypotheses drawn from the work of Joan Scott (1996) on abstract 
individualism, I have written elsewhere about the paradoxical situations in the 
field of rights and policies affecting sexuality Argentina (Cepeda 2008). 
28 The only research that offers an analysis along those lines is by Kristian Ruggiero 
(2000) for the nineteenth century. In “Not Guilty (Abortion and Infanticide in 
Nineteenth-Century Argentina, Ruggiero analyzes how the absence of penalization 
for a banned act can be explained by arguments for the protection of women. 
29 Among others, Maureen Cain (1990) coined the term standpoint to indicate that 
knowledge should be produced from the point of view of the oppressed. Even 
though I do not share this feminist philosophical perspective, it seemed interesting 
to me as a metaphor for the claims of a specific kind of gender writing that uses 
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Peronist era, it appears that abortion was a common practice, and was 
often seen as such. Neither judges nor prosecutors nor lawyers for 
the defense were surprised about “abortive measures”. In the cases 
that were judged to be “impossible offenses”, mothers who resorted 
to abortion in order to limit the number of children they had were 
acquitted. The cases that were not recognized as such tended to 
concern “repeat offenders” or childless women who used abortion as 
a method of contraception, thereby breaking the direct connection 
between sex and reproduction.30 
Why wasn’t the law applied more strictly? Perhaps the legal ban 
on abortion began to act as a norm integrated into a continuum of 
medical, legislative and moral measures whose regulatory function was to 
reinforce the prohibition rather than to enforce actual punishment. 
Did cheating take place in the Gaitán-Fuccia case? The contradictions 
inherent to strict application of the law, particularly the legal 
obligation to scientifically “prove” pregnancy without having the 
technical means to do so, worked in their favor. Their testimony, the 
only proof of the abortive measures, was hushed up for their own 
good. So women got around the law – until toads became famous 
and/or other reliable tests became available.31 
The drafters of the Penal Code required proof of pregnancy in 
order to prove that an abortion had been performed.32 All the 
                                                                                                             
judiciary and criminal source material. I recognize the importance of Gabriela Dalla 
Corte Caballero’s work, while at the same time maintaining a certain distance from 
it. In her work, she analyzes criminal cases concerning abortion, infanticide and 
child abandonment in the city of Rosario in the late nineteenth century, concluding 
that penal instructions were interpreted by magistrates to the advantage of women 
(particularly of single women responsible for “unwanted children”), but she does 
not analyze the contradictions inherent to the liberal legal system. 
30 This break occurred before the introduction of the contraceptive pill, or the 
debates about the sexual revolution, the greater permissiveness towards a range 
of sexual practices, and the feminist discourse which all appeared in the 1970s.  
31 A longer-term analysis of my doctoral work shows three ways that women 
“having practiced an abortion” were acquitted: since 1962, lawyers plead the legal 
concept of professional discretion, the impossible abortion attempt and what is termed a 
sentimental abortion. The most common justification is still the impossible attempt, 
but its frequency began to decline in the 1980s. 
32 Soler 1973.  
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commentators highlight the need to prove that the woman was pregnant, 
that the fetus was alive at the time of the agent’s act and that its death was caused 
by that act.33 While pregnancy is the necessary condition, the body of 
the embryo is not the corpus delicti, unlike what happens in the case of 
homicide. The only thing that needs to be proven is that the woman 
was pregnant. 
 
In the case presented here, the defendants were caught between a 
legal system that was trying to penalize them and a normative system 
of bio-political order.34 I have shown that the natalist rhetoric of the 
Peronist experiment did not necessarily jibe with the way in which 
judicial players intervened in criminal trials for abortion. Any analysis 
of national policy must be attentive to the actions that are taken 
within that nation’s administration, and the way in which the law is 
applied must be seen as an expression of a legal culture in which 
doctrinal aspects are reinterpreted. The law is not always what it 
seems to be. Thus it becomes possible for there to be a plethora of 
crafty, cunning “frogs,” rather than the toads whose name, in 
Argentinian slang, is synonymous with failure.35  
 
Translated by Regan KRAMER 
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